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Edwards: Miscellaneous

MISCELLANEOUS
HARRY L. EDWARDS*

Several cases of interest decided in South Carolina during
the past year could not be appropriately classified under
-general Survey Headings. Therefore, these cases have been
,grouped together under the heading of Miscellaneous, with
sub-headings to distinguish each unique issue presented.
Unemployment Compensation
A question of unemployment compensation was decided in

the case of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. The South Carolina Employment Security Com.mission.1 Twenty-four claimants joined in filing similar claims
for benefits, and the parties stipulated that although testinony would be taken only as to the claim of one, the decision
would be controlling in the cases of the others.
The claimant was employed by Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company in Union, South Carolina, prior to her
,discharge due to the company's change over from a manual
,to a dial operated system. Upon discharge on September 6,
1958, she was given one week's severance pay. On September
-8, 1958, she filed her initial claim for unemployment compensation. The claims examiner held that the wages paid conztituted wages for past services, and that the claimant was
mot thereby ineligible for unemployment compensation. His
-finding was upheld by the commission and upon judicial
review by the Court of Common Pleas for Union County, the
-commission was affirmed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court citing Industrial Com-mission v. Sirokman,2 Ackerson v. Western Union Telegraph
'Company,3 Western Union Telegraph Company v. Texas Employment Commission4 and Kroger Company v. Blumenthal,5
and referring to Section 7.04C3 of the employer-union agreement and Section 68-17, Code of Laws of South Carolina 1952,
;affirmed the lower court. The Court found that payment
*Member, Staff South Carolina Law Review.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

240 S. C. 40, 124 S. E. 2d 505 (1962).
134 Colo. 481, 306 P. 2d 669 (1957).
234 Minn. 271, 48 N. W. 2d 338 (1951).
243 S. W. 2d 217 (Tex. 1951).
13 Ill.
2d 222, 148 N. E. 2d 734 (1958).
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of a week's wages was merely a method of calculating theamount owed for services previously rendered under the union.
contract.
Penalties
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Southern.
Railway Company6 raised the issue of whether or not the
recovery of a fine imposed by section 3 of Act No. 627, 1956,.
Acts of the General Assembly of South Carolina required a.
civil action or a criminal prosecution.
Under the terms of the act, the State Highway Department:
is given the power to require construction and maintenanceof certain grade crossings by railroad operators in this state.
Failure to comply within 30 days subjects the railroads to a,
fine of ten dollars per day for each day's delay.
The State Highway Department instituted civil proceedings.
in the Court of Common Pleas against Southern RailwayCompany for an order to require the defendant to construct
a crossing over one of its railroads, and for the collection of'
the fine imposed by the act for failure to construct the crossing on demand of the plaintiff. The defendant moved to.
strike a portion of the complaint referring to recovery of the,
fine on the grounds that a criminal conviction was necessarybefore such fine could be imposed. The motion was granted
by the lower court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, stating that
the word "Fine" as used in the act meant penalty and could,
be construed as criminal or civil. They determined that since
the violation of the act was not a criminal offense, the
legislature did not intend to limit the meaning of the word
fine to its restricted sense as punishment for a crime. TheCourt concluded that although the collection of a fine can
involve proceedings either criminal or civil, where no mentiomL
is made as to the method of collection, as was the case here,,
it may be collected by a civil action.
Labor Relations
The National Labor Relations Act was held not to exclude'
the state from acting in the case of alleged tortious action
by an employer and a labor union
against an employee in
7
Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear,Inc.
6. 239 S. C. 227, 122 S. E. 2d 422 (1961).
7. 239 S. C. 415, 123 S. E. 2d 524 (1962).
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Plaintiffs were employed by Jolog Sportswear, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Jonathan Logan, Inc. None of
the plaintiffs except one had ever been a member of, or
affiliated with the defendant union. Plaintiffs were entitled
to certain vacation pay and were notified by the defendant
employer that the money would be distributed by the defendant union. The union issued checks to the plaintiffs, but
withheld certain amounts.
Plaintiffs claimed that this was in violation of sections
40-46.2 and 40-126 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina. The defendants demurred and the lower court sustained
on the grounds that the courts of South Carolina have no
jurisdiction to determine the issues involved because they are
within exclusive control of the National Labor Relations
Board.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the courts of
South Carolina had jurisdiction to determine the questions
arising under the facts alleged. Citing Garner v. Teamsters
Union,8 the Court said that Congress has not excluded all
state action in the field of industrial relations, and International Union United Auto Workers v. Russell,9 which stated
that "[S]tate jurisdiction has not been preempted where the
consequences of the conduct involved were of compelling
state interest." In the present case, the Court found such an
interest, pointing to the fact that section 40-46.10 of the 1960
cumulative supplement to the 1952 Code of Laws makes it a
criminal offense to withhold wages of an employee against his
will to be paid as fees or dues to an organization.
Creditors' Rights
In Klein v. Kneece,10 an action was brought against the
appellant, a judgment debtor, to set aside a deed made by him
to his wife as having been made in violation of the Statute of
Elizabeth, now in force in this state as section 57-301 of the
1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina.
The conveyance in question was made on October 26, 1950,
and the judgment obtained on August 9, 1951. An execution
on the judgment was issued and delivered to the Sheriff of
Richland County, and returned nulla bona. The present action
was commenced on August 26, 1960.
8. 346 U. S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 161 (1953).
9. 356 U. S. 634, 78 S. Ct. 932 (1958).
10. 239 S. C. 478, 123 S. E. 2d 870 (1962).
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The appellants affirmatively pleaded the statute of limitations as a bar to the action and moved for a motion on the
pleadings. The trial judge refused to grant the motion on the
grounds that this defense could only be determined by a trial
of the factual issues presented by the pleadings.
The appellants contended that the pleadings raised no issue
of fact and the motion should have been granted since only
an issue of law was involved. The South Carolina Supreme
Court agreed with this contention, and reversed the lower
court.
After disposing of question of pleading, the Court stated
that the statute of limitations began to run from the time
the Sheriff made the null bona return. Under Section
10-143 (7) of the 1952 Code the six-year statute of limitation
begins to run at the time of the acquisition of knowledge of
such facts that are sufficient to put the party on inquiry
which, if developed, will disclose the alleged fraud. In this
case, the respondent knew that the appellant possessed real
estate at the time credit was extended since an affidavit of
the president of the respondent stated that one factor in
extending credit to the appellant was that he owned the
aforementioned real estate in fee simple. The return nulla
bona declared that at the time of execution the appellant had
no property upon which to levy. Therefore, respondent was
put on the inquiry required in the above code section at the
time the null bona was returned.
Usury
Atlantic Discount Corporation v. Driskell,n required a
determination of penalties for usury under sections 8-3 and
8-5 of the South Carolina Code of Laws.
Respondents sought to foreclose in equity, a mortgage
given for a promisory note executed by appellants. The face
value of the note was $576.00, but the appellants had received
only $425.00 from respondents. The matter was referred to a
master, and he determined that $134.51 of this discounted
amount was usurious interest actually received by respondents.
Accordingly he awarded appellants double this amount in
accordance with section 8-5 of the South Carolina Code of
Laws.
11. 239 S. C. 500, 123 S. E. 2d 832 (1962).
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The judge of the county court on appeal found that the
$134.51 was usurious interest, but had not actually been
received by the respondents, and held that the appellants were
entitled to recover double the amount of interest allocated to
the aggregate of monthly payments made by them.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the county
court was correct in its determination that the terms of the
note and chattel mortgage placed in evidence by respondent
did not support the master's finding. The actual amount
sought by the appellants was $425.00, which they received.
They were to repay this in 18 installments of $32.00 each.
The Court found that the trial judge's calculations were correct
in view of the evidence.
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